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The Relationship between High Inflation and Output in 
Brazil from 1975 to 2002.
Abstract
The macroeconomic policies undertaken by Brazilian policymakers during the 
60’s, 70’s, 80’s, and 90’s—namely high growth of money supply, huge budget deficits, 
and the excessive use of inflation tax—created an inflation crisis comparable to 
Germany’s hyperinflationary period. Consequently, the effects of high inflation on 
different Brazilian economic variables have become interesting and challenging subjects 
to macroeconomists. This paper attempts to describe the effect of high inflation on 
output in Brazil between 1975 and 2002. By running a simple linear regression model, I 
find that, unlike many other studies, there is a positive relationship between inflation and 
output in Brazil during this period. More specifically, the results suggest that a 1% 
increase in average inflation produces a 0.0066% increase in output. This result is 
possible due to the Brazilian government’s use of inflation to promote growth (Tobin 
Effect). Furthermore, this action by the government is responsible for the enormous 
income inequality found in Brazil.
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1. Introduction
In the 1960’s inflation began to rise in Brazil. Very soon it became the number 
one problem of the Brazilian economy. Every administration that took over the 
government employed a formula to try to eliminate inflation. Their policies included 
wage and price controls, constant changes in fiscal and monetary policies, fiscal reforms, 
fixed exchange rates, and changes in currency. However, the government’s inability to 
balance its budget, fight corruption, and make a concerted effort to eradicate inflation 
resulted in enormous budget deficits, high growth of the money supply and, ultimately, 
hyperinflation throughout the 80’s and 90’s. What became clear was the government’s 
abusive use of inflation tax to finance its spending. Ruge-Murcia (1999) describes the 
relationship between high inflation and the process of creating money to finance a budget 
deficit using data on Brazil between January 1980 and December 1989.
During these four decades of frustrated macroeconomic policy the standards of 
living of the Brazilian population worsened. Poverty multiplied and spread around urban 
centers, while the concentration of income on the hands of a minority put Brazil in the 
top of the list of countries with most cruel economic and social inequality in the world. 
These facts grasp the interest of macroeconomists, challenging them to study the effects 
of the Brazilian hyperinflation on different economic variables. For example, De Paula 
(1998) studies behavior changes of private banks due to high inflation, while Dole, et al 
(2000) describes the interaction between workers and firms under hyperinflation.
In this paper I study the effect of high inflation on output in Brazil from 1975 to 
2002. By running a simple linear regression on Brazilian quarterly data I find that 
inflation positively affects output. Moreover, I find that a 1% increase in average
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inflation causes a 0.0066% increase in output. The results suggest that the government 
used an inflation-fosters-growth mentality during the period in study, which significantly 
contributed to such a positive relationship.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the data on 
GDP and inflation used in this study. In section 3 ,1 present the empirical work and 
discuss the results. Section 4 concludes the paper with some additional remarks. As a 
complementary part to this paper, section 5 provides the reader with a synopsis of 
Brazilian economic policy from 1964 to 2002 in appendix A and tables and graphs 




In this paper I used two different kinds of data on GDP. For analytical purpose, I 
used quarterly data on Real Gross Domestic Product for the period from 1975 to 2002. 
This data is originated from IPEADATA ('http://www.ipeadata.gov.brT The reason for 
this choice is that yearly data would only provide me with 27 observations, which is a 
very small sample space for the regression to be significant. Instead, I used quarterly 
data, which multiplies the sample by four and allows for better estimations of the model. 
Table 2 provides this data, while figure 5 provides a graph of the same.
However, for descriptive purpose, I used throughout the text that appears in 
appendix A annual percentage change of Real Gross Domestic Product for the period 
from 1964 to 2002 to illustrate Brazilian economic performance. This data is originated 
from APECAO XLII. The explanation for this choice is to give the reader a numerical 
image of the Brazilian economic situation described in the text. Table 3 provides this 
data, while figure 6 provides a graph of the same.
2.2 Inflation
Similarly, I have also used two different types of data on Inflation. For the 
statistical model, I used quarterly data on the consumer price index for the period from 
1975 to 2002. This data is originated from IPEADATA ('http://www.ipeadata.gov.brV 
The source provides the monthly data throughout the period. I formed the quarterly data 
by adding together the monthly inflation rates of the months respective to each quarter. 
Once again, the reason for such choice is that the quarterly data multiplies the sample by
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four, allowing for better estimations of the model. Table 4 provides this data, while 
figure 7 provides a graph of the same.
For descriptive purpose, I used throughout the text that appears in appendix A 
annual percentage change in consumer price index for the period from 1964 to 2002 to 
illustrate the Brazilian inflationary phenomenon. This data is originated from Library o f 
Congress (between 1964 and 1996) and IBGE (between 1997 and 2002). In order to 
incorporate both sources I used the following proportion:
1997 Inflation rate = [(1996 IBGE rate) /  (1996 Lib. Cong, rate)] x (1997 IBGE rate)
I incorporated both sources in order to have a complete set of data to cover the entire 
period of study. This data was also used to give the reader a numerical image of the 
Brazilian inflationary phenomenon described in the text of appendix A. Table 5 provides 
this data, while figure 8 provides a graph of the same.
2.3 Miscellaneous
Throughout section 3 of this paper I used graphs and a table of different economic 
variables to illustrate Brazilian economic performance during the period under study. 
Figure 1 shows Capital Formation from 1970 to 2002. Figure 2 shows Interest Rate and 
Inflation from 1975 to 2002. Figure 3 shows the Population Living Below Poverty Line 
from 1977 to 1999. Figure 4 shows the Gini Coefficient from 1977 to 1999. Figures 1,
3, and 4 originated from IPEADATA (http://www.ipeadata.gov.br). Also, figure 2 was 
made from data that originated from IPEADA TA (http://www.ipeadata.gov.br). In 
addition, table 1 shows the top 10 countries with highest Gini Coefficients.
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3. Empirical Work
In order to study the relationship between inflation and output in Brazil I used the 
following simple linear regression model:
y  -  GDP
log(y) = a  + p[log(xi)] + y(x2) +€, where xi = GDPt-i (lag of GDP)
X2 = rate of change in prices (inflation)
This model relates the log of GDP to the log of lagged GDP (GDPt-i) and the rate 
of change in prices (inflation). The above relation allows for the measurement of the 
magnitude of the relationship between inflation and output. The lagged of GDP serves as 
a proxy for all other variables affecting GDP. This relation is in line with the dictum of 
Rational Expectation Hypothesis. These specifications also allow us a better 
understanding of the effect of the effect of inflation on output. The table below shows 
the estimation results.
Table I
GDP is dependent variable: 1975 -  2002 sample, quarterly data
Variable Coefficient Standard errors P Value
Intercept + 0.07069 0.02230 0.0020
Log[GDPn] + 0.99843 0.00156 <0.0001
Inflation + 0.00660 0.00047498 <0.0001
W
The results in Table 1 show a strong positive relationship among the variables. 
This is evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient of the variables and the p- 
values. In addition, since this model relates the rate of change in GDP to the rate of
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change in prices, the coefficient of the inflation variable also illustrates the magnitude of 
inflation’s effect on output. It can be interpreted as follows: a 1% increase in inflation 
produces a 0.0066% increase in GDP. The corresponding p value (the smallest error 
level at which the null can be rejected) for this coefficient proves this result to be 
statistically significant (<0.0001), implying that this finding is robust. Furthermore, the 
R-Square (the proportional variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by 
the model) found in the model is extremely high (0.9997), suggesting that this model is 
successful in estimating such relationship.
Our results are not consistent a number of other studies for many highly 
developed countries. In developed countries high inflation produces uncertainty and 
leads to lower investment and production. Faria and Cameiro (2001) found that in the 
short run there exists a negative effect from high inflation on output, while Engelbrecht 
and Langley (2001) described that high rates of inflation are associated to negative per 
capita GDP growth rate. Andres and Hernando (1997) depicted a negative effect of 
inflation on per capita income, whereas in Braumann (2000), high inflation had a 
negative impact on output.
The explanation for a negative impact of rampant inflation on output relies on the 
costs of inflation. In the presence of high inflation, individuals rush their transactions so 
as to rid themselves of depreciating cash. Besides, knowing inflation erodes the value of 
money, individuals avoid this decrease in value by holding less money (shoeleather cost). 
Holding less money means more trips to the bank, time that could have been spent 
producing goods and services. In addition, other costs of rampant inflation arise from the 
misallocation of resources. For once, there is the cost of updating prices (menu cost),
since firms must change prices more often during a period of high inflation. This 
represents a misallocation of resources, as the same resources could have been used on 
investment on physical or human capital for the expansion of production. Furthermore, 
high inflation undermines the confidence of investors about the future course of monetary 
policy and reduces total factor productivity, worsening the long-run macroeconomic 
performance of the economy.
In the case of Brazil during the period in study, high inflation did not hinder GDP 
growth. In fact, the opposite is the case. The Brazilian government used inflation to 
promote growth. They relied on what’s known as the Tobin Effect. As Tobin (1965) 
suggests, an increase in the inflation rate causes a greater holding of capital relative to 
money, increasing output and consumption. This study followed Mundell (1963), which 
argued that anticipated inflation is likely to raise the money interest rate by less than the 
rate of inflation itself. Ahmed and Rogers (1996) showed that in the long run the effect 
of inflation on output is positive (“Tobin type effect”). Policymakers strongly believed 
on this idea that inflation buys growth. Therefore, they took advantage of the commonly 
seen sneaky, short-lived increases in inflation to temporarily fool the economy into 
growing faster than it normally would.
Within a microeconomic scope, this mechanism also made sense for Brazilian 
policymakers. The Brazilian high inflation experience persisted for decades, creating a 
social phenomenon called inflationary culture. The population became accustomed to 
price increases and began to anticipate inflation. By anticipating inflation, individuals 
were able to work their ways around it. They understood that inflation automatically 
reduced people’s wealth. Therefore, to accumulate the desired wealth, individuals held a
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fraction of their income to meet their immediate needs and saved the rest, thus driving 
down the real interest rate. Petrucci (1999) found a positive effect of the money growth 
rate on capital, labor and output that gives support to the Tobin Effect. Greater saving 
means greater capital accumulation and thus faster output growth. As figure 1 illustrates, 
capital accumulation indeed followed an upward trend during the period in study.
Figure 1
However, the interest rate did not seem to fall when inflation increased like the Tobin 




Interest Rate and Inflation, Brazil -  1975 to 2002
What, then, went wrong with the model? The answer is: you cannot save what 
you do not have. Those individuals who had enough wealth indeed increased their rate of 
savings. But they represented a minority. The vast majority of the Brazilian population 
did not have high enough levels of wealth to divide it up into money for immediate 
transactions and savings. Those, instead, watched prices go up and their money lose its 
purchasing power. Braumann (2001) shows that high inflation reduces real wages 
through a shift in relative prices, a mechanism that may contribute to rising poverty 
during periods of high inflation. This unfair system lasted for a long time; long enough 
to be responsible for the multiplication of poverty and the development of huge ghettos
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around Brazilian urban centers. With an annual periodicity (despite missing the years of 
1980, 1991, and 1994), figure 3 illustrates the number of people in Brazil that live below 
the poverty line. From 1977 to 1999 the average people living below the poverty line in 
Brazil was 53.27 million, reaching a low of 37.60 million people in 1986 and a high of 
63.63 million people in 1984.
Figure 3
This horrendous stage of poverty that Brazil displays is the result of the 
concentration of income on the hands of a minority. Also displaying an annual 
periodicity (and missing the years of 1980, 1991, and 1994), figure 4 shows the Gini 
Coefficient for Brazil, which is a statistic used to measure how evenly income is 
distributed. The closer the Gini Coefficient is to 1.00 the more uneven is the income 
distribution. Figure 4 shows that Brazil has had a very high and steady level of economic
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and social inequality, since its Gini Coefficient has averaged 0.603 and reached a low of 
0.583 in 1992 and a high of 0.637 in 1989 during the period under study.
Figure 4
In fact, Brazil is the 5th worst country in the world when it comes to income distribution.
This is shown in table 2 below
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Table 2
Top 10 Countries with Highest Gini Coefficient
Rank Country Gini Coefficient
1. Sierra Leone 63 (1989)
2. Central African Republic 60(1993)




7. South Africa 59(1993- 1994)
8. Chile 58 (1996)
9. Paraguay 58 (1998)
10. Colombia 57(1996)
Source: http ://www.nationmaster. com
Brazilian policymakers tried to maintain growth using inflation but, as 
policymakers usually do, they failed to consider the long term effects of that measure. 
Kasa (1999) advises that monetary authorities may come to believe that there is an 
exploitable relationship between inflation and output, even when no such relationship 
exists, which provides a reason why monetary policy may be subject to a persistent 
inflation bias. Also, Mallik and Chowdhury (2001) provide evidence of a long-run 
positive relationship between GDP growth rate and inflation, adding that moderate 
inflation is helpful to growth, but faster economic growth feeds back into inflation.
Unlike policymakers, economists, have the ability to study the long-term effects 
of policies before their implementation, since they do not depend on the political process. 
Economists, such as Gylfason and Herbertsson (2001) know that inflation in excess of 
10-20 percent per year is generally detrimental to growth. They agree with Fisher et al 
(2002) who suggest that high inflation is associated with poor macroeconomic 
performance. In the case of Brazil, poor economic performance came in terms of the
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Brazilian economy not performing to its potential between the 1960’s and 1990’s. The 
result, as known, is a four-decade turbulent period of low growth (including two 
recessionary periods) that seriously jeopardized Brazil’s future economic health.
One other feature of this simple linear regression model that needs clarification is 
the intercept variable. The intercept term cannot be explained by the explanatory 
variables, since it represents the effects of the omitted variables and misspecifications of 
the model. In addition to the lagged values of GDP and inflation rate, current GDP is 
also determined by factors such as the level of investment, the magnitude of government 
spending and taxes, net exports, the stage of technological knowledge, and the quantity of 
physical capital, human capital, and natural resources. This task, however, is beyond the 
scope of this paper.
Additionally, the use of more sophisticated econometric techniques also could be 
used to extract better results from this study, such as using time series analysis, 
cointegration, and other techniques to study the joint properties of the series. This option 
is what I look forward to in the near future, as I dive deeper into the realm of economic 
analysis and prepare myself for post-graduate work.
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4. Concluding Remarks
Using quarterly data on inflation and GDP, 1975 -  2002, this paper presents a 
positive relationship between high inflation and output. The findings contradict some 
current research that proposes a negative impact of high inflation on output. According 
to Barbosa, this outcome is a product of unbalanced economic development due to 
frequent mistaken policy decisions. Indeed, excessive government spending and 
recurring federal budget deficits significantly contributed to the economic instabilities of 
the period in study, namely high inflation and unemployment.
Balancing the budget overtime would alleviate the need for the Brazilian Central 
Bank to monetize the government’s debt. Also, a responsible fiscal policy would allow 
for sensible monetary policy which, in turn, removes inflationary pressures that result 
from extreme money growth. These steps would definitely enhance the economy. 
However, some economists believe that prudent macroeconomic policies are only part of 
the answer. According to Acemoglu (2003), countries pursuing poor macroeconomic 
policies also have weak institutions, ineffective enforcement of property rights for 
investors, widespread corruption, and a high degree of political instability. This view not 
only applies to Brazil, but should be determinedly considered by policymakers if the 
country is to strive in its quest to becoming a modernized nation.
In order for Brazil to overcome the unfortunate experience of low growth paired 
with social inequality, strengthening institutions, enforcing property rights, and reducing 
corruption are only the beginning steps. Future governments will also have to develop 
policies to address several areas of the economy that have demonstrated weaknesses. 
Those include: better stabilization policies, greater investment in human capital,
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improvement of the monetary regime to a more stable one that includes fiscal discipline, 
and stronger equity considerations that include the improvement of social infrastructures 
such as health care, education, public transportation systems, and housing for the poor. 
These recommendations can be seen as a framework for Brazilian policymakers to use to 
speed up the development process of the Brazilian economy.
5. Appendices 
5.1 Appendix A
Synopsis of Brazilian economic policy, 1964 -  2002
During the 1960’s the political and economic future of Brazil was very uncertain. 
High inflation, an enormous external debt, the constant devaluation of the currency, and 
the lack of parity between price and wage increases created a social tension never seen 
before in the Brazilian society. The immense regional economic disparities, the 
development of substantial poverty, and the massive migration of rural residents into 
industrialized cities contributed to the rapid spread of Communism during the Populist 
Republic.
Fearing the uncertainty of the country’s future, the Military decided it was time 
for a change. In 1964, the Military overthrew President Joao Goulart and took control of 
government. Tired of being simply the judge of national politics, the Military became the 
absolute power. They instated a dictatorship-like regime that switched presidents every 
five years, with presidents being chosen among high army officials. At this point all 
decisions, including political and economic, were made by the Army.
The Military Regime (1964 -1984)
The new militaiy regime faced three basic problems with the economic sector: 
rampant inflation, economic stagnation due to lack of investments, and a deficit in the 
balance of payments. This situation kept the country in a sub-developed state, making it 
more vulnerable to the infiltration of communism. Promoting economic development 
became not only an issue of national security but also the biggest challenge of Mai. 
Castello Branco, the first president of Brazil under the military regime.
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Castello Branco Administration (1964 to 1967):
The Castello Branco administration had two priorities: fighting inflation and 
attracting foreign investments. In order to fight inflation (83.9% in 1964), the new 
administration restricted credit, reduced the government deficit (US$3 billion in 1964), 
eliminated subsidies to gas, paper, wheat, and rent, increased taxes and tariffs over public 
services, and promoted a freeze in all salaries. To stimulate the entry of foreign capital, 
the Castello administration improved the conditions for profit by abolishing a law against 
the remittance of profits abroad and reduced taxes over profits for foreign companies who 
re-invested in production or imported machinery considered of national interest.
The actions taken by the Castello administration contributed to the low increase in 
GDP (2.4% in 1965), proven by the increase in the number of bankruptcies and the 
decrease in worker’s purchasing power (due to the wage freeze). The reliance on foreign 
capital created a dependence on multinational corporations by the Brazilian economy. 
Those corporations started to associate themselves to, and absorb, Brazilian companies, 
beginning a process of internationalization of the economy. Good examples of this 
process are VEMAG S. A., absorbed by Volkswagen, and Banco Lar Brasileiro absorbed 
by Chase Manhattan.
Most important, this administration was characterized by the beginning of intense 
government intervention on internal and external economic relations. This was evident in 
the greater participation of military officials in national companies and in the board of 
trustees of multinational corporations, a trend that did not diminish in future 
administrations under the military regime.
Costa E Silva Administration (1967 to 1969):
As the second president during the military regime, Mai. Costa E Silva tried to 
correct the negative effects of the economic policy from the prior administration and 
provide conditions for solid economic growth. The new economic team gave the private 
sector conditions to develop by stimulating investments, giving incentives to the export 
sector to expand Brazil’s external commerce, and investing heavily in health and 
education to supply urban and industrial centers with workers with a minimum of 
professional capacity.
Government participation in the economy increased during this administration.
The involvement of state-owned companies in national production was amplified. The 
Brazilian middle class was especially targeted, as they benefited from the growing 
demand for labor in the services sector, extended internal credit, and an expanded 
national housing system by the government. These measures increased the middle 
classes’ purchasing power, enabling them to buy cars, houses, and house appliances. The 
economic policy of this administration laid down the bases for the “Brazilian Miracle.” 
Medici Administration (1969 to 1974)
Therefore, when Emilio Garrastazu Medici became president in 1969, he not only 
had an economy technically ready to grow, but he also had the experience of watching 
previous administrations try to solve the country’s economic problems. Due to the failure 
of previous administrations to eliminate inflation, the Medici administration chose to 
institutionalize it (keeping it around 20% annually). The government began to control 
inflation by using a process of automatic monetary correction1. This process affected
1 The process of automatic monetary correction consisted of the government correcting wages and 
investments by the inflation rate of the previous month.
Brazilians in different ways. The wages of lower sectors of the Brazilian society were 
kept below the cost of living. The wages of higher sectors of the society, however, 
increased. They took advantage of the fact that companies began to hire high-skilled 
labor, such as managers and specialized technicians. Consequently, the middle and 
higher classes increased demand for durable goods, food, expensive liquor, luxurious 
cloth, and so on.
This great desire to consume stimulated the industry to resume its economic 
growth. Besides, companies benefited from the liberal policy of credit, the low wages 
earned by blue-collar workers, the opening of international commerce, and the ease to 
obtain loans abroad. Brazil began to export not only raw materials and semi- 
industrialized products, but also industrialized products such as canned meat, 
concentrated and dehydrated fruit juice, soluble coffee, clothing, televisions, and radios. 
This six-year period (1968 to 1974), characterized by accelerated growth (10.72% 
average GDP growth) and low inflation (20.94% average inflation rate), was named the 
“Brazilian Economic Miracle.”
The “Brazilian Economic Miracle” had, however, negative long-term effects in 
the country. First, this period was responsible for the income concentration by the higher 
layers of society. The lower sector of the society, who now had jobs and benefited from 
new lines of credit, was seduced by society’s appeal to consume. The result was a cycle 
of progressive indebtedness by the population in order to buy televisions, radios, cars, 
and other goods. Second, this concentration of income became concentration of capital. 
Small producers and businesspeople were sacrificed by excessive taxation and the 
government’s price control system, while bigger companies producing for exportation
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benefited from tax incentives. Eventually, bigger companies absorbed the small firms, 
resulting in concentration of capital. Another result of the “Brazilian Economic Miracle” 
was the rapid expansion of Brazil’s external debt, which increased from US$4.4 billion in 
1969 to US$17.1 billion in 1974 (Dominguez 361), as it was necessary to obtain greater 
amounts of foreign capital, factors of production (technology), and raw materials (crude 
oil).
Geisel Administration (1974 to 1979)
When Ernesto Geisel took over the presidency in 1974 the “Brazilian Economic 
Miracle” appeared to be over. The country could no longer maintain high rates of growth 
paired with low rates of inflation, as the expansion that occurred during the “Brazilian 
Miracle” went beyond the capacity of the market for factors of production.
Transportation, raw materials, labor, and basic food items became scarce, while the 
supply of public services such as water, electricity, and telephones became deficient in 
face of the great demand. To solve this problem, the Geisel administration contracted 
loans from abroad, imported the products that were missing in the Brazilian market, 
broadened exports by penetrating new markets, and substituted imports.
It is important to mention that in 1973 the world market was affected by a 
generalized crisis in international finances and the War in the Middle East. Imported 
crude oil suffered an incredible price increase, which affected Brazil tremendously, as the 
country’s economic model was based on the automobile industry and road transportation. 
Despite the poor economic situation abroad, the administration took several loans to pay 
for imports, resume economic development, and execute the program of import
W
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substitution. This model of economic expansion deteriorated the country’s international 
accounts, increasing the external debt to US$49,9 billion (Dominguez 362).
The government’s economic policy was accompanied by the expansion of 
industry, commerce, banks, and the ever-growing consumption by the higher layers of 
society. Trying to contain this tendency, the government reduced spending, increased the 
price of imports considered superfluous, mandated a salary compression, liberated 
interest rates charged by banks for loans to companies, increased the price of gas, and 
closed gas stations on weekends and holidays. However, none of these measures worked 
as expected. The inflation rate became even higher (85.7% in 1978) due to the oil crisis 
and the increases in the price of rice, beans, com, potatoes, onions, and tapioca. The 
Brazilian Miracle was definitely over and the country appeared to be heading into a 
recession.
Figueiredo Administration (1979 to 1985)
The economic conditions could not be worse when Joao Baptista Figueiredo 
became president. In 1979 occurred the second shock in the oil market, followed by the 
increase in international interest rates. The new administration tried to execute a program 
of economic austerity in order to adjust Brazil’s economy to the global crisis. Measures 
to slow down economic activity were taken, including the reduction of fiscal incentives to 
exports; the reduction of government spending; and an increase in investment in the 
extraction of oil in order to decrease imports. The economic slowdown program lasted 
only six months. Under a lot of pressure, the government changed its economic team, 
reinstated its previous economic policy of growth, and revoked all measures focusing on 
economic slowdown, making economic growth its main objective again.
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The expansionary policy brought difficulties to obtain loans, which forced the
government to adopt a series of restrictive measures. By 1981 the country went into a
deep recession, illustrated by the steep decline in economic activity (GDP fell 4.3%) and
the increase in unemployment (7.9% in 1981). Inflation skyrocketed (109.9% in 1981)
while wages remained unchanged, decreasing the purchasing power of the Brazilian
middle class. The recession greatly affected the state-owned companies, as the
government decreased investment on them to cut spending.
The tough economic times forced the government to ask the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for help. The IMF agreed to guarantee Brazil’s credibility abroad
so that the country could get loans and attract investments. However, Brazil had to
follow a program of financial and economic stability, which included the following
conditions: large cuts in spending, an increase in exports, and the compression of wages.
The Brazilian economy started being “tutored” by the IMF.
The biggest contribution made by the Figueiredo administration came in the field
of politics. Recognizing that the military regime had weakened due to its inability to
strengthen the Brazilian society and develop the country’s economy, this administration
gave birth to the process of national re-democratization. Several measures were taken
during the five years of the Figueiredo administration in order to turn Brazil back into a
democracy. Finally, on January 15th, 1985, the new president of Brazil was elected.
Brazil entered a new phase in its history: The New Republic.
The New Republic (1985 -  present)
At the end of the military regime, the Brazilian economy showed confusing signs.
The 1981-83 recession seemed to be over by the end of 1984. However, inflation 
W
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(220.6% in 1984) jeopardized the economy by corroding the purchasing power of 
workers and creating a big hole in the public accounts. During the New Republic, 
inflation became the great problem of Brazil’s economy. In order to confront inflation, 
the government created successive “economic packages,” but yearly inflation rates were 
still high. This situation created a social phenomenon called “inflationary culture.” The 
population became accustomed to price increases and consumed without any type of 
planning.
Sarney Administration (1985 to 1990)
When Jose Sarney took over, the country was stuck in a vicious financial cycle. 
That is, entrepreneurs preferred to invest their profits in financial markets, rather than 
back in production. This created a lack of investments that only worsened the country’s 
producing capability. In order to fight off inflation, promote better income distribution,
^m J
and restart to expand economically, the Sarney administration created the Cruzado Plan.
The Cruzado Plan (February o f1986)
Implemented on February 28,1986, the Cruzado Plan adopted the following measures:
1. Switch of currencies from Cruzeiro (Cr$) to Cruzado (Cz$). The government mainly cut 
three zeros off of the old currency, using the following proportion: 1 Cruzado is equal to 
1,000 Cruzeiros [CzSl.OO = Cr$l,000.00];
2. Complete freeze of all prices, fares, services, and wages for a year,
3. A wage increase of 8% for workers in general and 15% for the minimum-wage, in 
addition to future readjustments that would be made automatically (wage trigger) every 
time inflation added up to 20%, and;
4. Extinction of the monetary correction. From this point on, wages and investments were 
no longer corrected by the inflation rate of the previous month.
Bento 24
W
The price-freeze and the wage increase created an exaggerated wave of 
consumption: savings accounts were emptied out, while sales reached a maximum. 
Consequently, companies increased working hours and labor, and enlarged their 
production capacity. The capital invested in financial markets was transferred to the 
stock market. It was the beginning of the much-waited economic growth after a 
major recession.
Four months later, however, the Cruzado Plan started to fail. Many products 
disappeared from the market, as the industry could not keep up with demand. 
Entrepreneurs complained they were taken by surprise and that their prices were out of 
line. Many products were reintroduced with different packaging to justify price 
increases. In November of 1986, the government launched the Cruzado II Plan in order 
to readjust the economy.
The Cruzado II Plan basically cancelled the price freeze and restored monetary 
correction. Tariffs for mail, telephones, electricity, and the prices of fuel, cigarettes, 
liquor, and medicine increased considerably. The government also suspended payment 
of the interest rates related to the external debt (this way, the country did not have to send 
billions of dollars abroad every year). As prices went up, the wage trigger went off 
several times. However, since wages could not accompany inflation, people’s purchasing 
power decreased. Consequently, sales plummeted and many companies, especially small 
and of medium size, broke. Without a solution to inflation, which closed 1986 at 
142.3%, the Samey administration switched its economic team.
The new economic team launched on June 16th, 1987 the Bresser Plan. This plan 
decreed: a 90-day freeze on prices, wages, and rents; the extinction of the wage trigger;
the creation of a mechanism to adjust prices and salaries every 3 months based on the 
average inflation of the previous 3 months; a small devaluation of the Cruzado in relation 
to the dollar; and a decrease in government spending.
The result of these measures was, at first, positive: inflation fell while sales had a 
small increase, and the level of employment stabilized. However, the country did not 
believe in the effectiveness of the new plan and soon the situation reversed itself: prices 
went back up, the population’s purchasing power fell, and the government began 
repaying the interest rates owed due to the pressure by foreign creditors. Inflation 
reached 224.8% in 1987 and GDP only grew by3.5%. On December of 1987, the 
government had no other choice than switching its economic team once again.
The new economic team spent the year of 1988 trying to normalize the country’s 
economic situation. The result, however, did not show progress: inflation reached 
684.5% and GDP fell 0.1%. As an alternative, the government launched a new plan on 
January 15th, 1989 called The Summer Plan. The Summer Plan’s measures included: a 
new price and wage freeze; the substitution of the Cruzado (Cz$) for the New Cruzado 
(NCz$), cutting three zeros off of the old currency and using the proportion 1 New 
Cruzado is equal to 1,000 Cruzados [NCz$1.00 = Cz$l,000.00]; the extinction of 
monetary correction and creation of a new mechanism for monthly wage adjustment, 
based on the inflation of the previous month; and the increase in interest rates to inhibit 
consumption and the formation of inventory.
The Summer Plan did not take long to fail. Abusive price readjustments helped 
inflation skyrocket. Investors changed all their funds into financial assets such as gold, 
dollars, stocks, and overnights, while prices started being announced in dollars. The
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increasing fear of hyperinflation (which reached 1,320%) made 1989 a year of economic 
terror.
Collor Administration (1990 to 1992)
The expectations towards the newly elected administration were very high. By 
the new president’s request, the country decreed a holiday for banks, closing them for 
two days. With closed banks, President Fernando Collor de Mello announced his plan to 
eliminate inflation.
The Brazil Plan or the Collor I Plan (March of 1990)
The Collor I Plan was composed of several measures, which included:
1. The return of Cruzeiro (Cr$) as national currency without change in value;
2. Blockage for 18 months of all bank accounts above NCz$50,000.00;
3. Partial freeze of prices and wages;
4. Opening of the economy to foreign investments and gradual reduction of taxes on imports;
5. Adoption of floating exchange rates;
6. Increase in taxes and tariffs and creation of a tax over financial transactions;
7. Administrative reform and reduction of government spending;
8. Creation of a program to privatize state-owned companies, and;
9. Reduction to a minimum of state intervention in the economy.
The blockage of all accounts shocked the economy. Technically, the countiy was 
leveled: everyone who had money in banks could only use NCz$50,000.00. The 
price and wage freezes, however, loosened as soon as May came. Employers and 
employees were allowed to negotiate contracts, but the wage trigger was prohibited. 
Inflation seemed under control (inflation fell from 224.90% in the first quarter of 
1990 to 29.43% in the second quarter of 1990), but recession was a threat to society
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again. Strikes, reduction of working hours, and dismissals contributed to a decrease 
in GDP (GDP fell by 4.4% in 1990). Besides, the government could not reduce 
spending, which contributed to the poor performance of the economy.
In an attempt to improve the economy, the Collor administration launched on 
January 31st, 1991 the Collor II Plan. The Collor II Plan adopted the following measures: 
the end of operations “overnight”; an increase in the tax over financial transactions and of 
public fares; a price and wage freezes; the readjustment of rents based on salary 
variations, and; a new reduction of taxes on imports.
The new plan did not produce significant results. Despite a fall in inflation 
(414.7% in 1991), unemployment increased (4.15% in 1991), companies went bankrupt, 
and industrial production, as well as economic activity and profits, decreased (GDP only 
increased by 1% in 1991). Several products were authorized to have prices readjusted 
and, as wages did not increase accordingly, workers saw their purchasing power corrode 
again. Poverty multiplied and spread around urban centers in the form of huge ghettos. 
The concentration of income on the hands of a minority put Brazil in the top of the list of 
countries with most cruel economic and social inequality in the world.
Besides his failure with the economy, President Collor’s credibility was also 
affected by accusations of corruption is his administration. These accusations were 
investigated and a big corruption system was found involving President Collor, his close 
advisor, his secretary, and a few other politicians. In a process that took more than a 






Franco Administration (1992 to 1995)
Fighting off government deficit was the objective of the Franco administration. 
Several measures were adopted to meet this objective, including policies to combat tax 
evasions and contract defaults, the expansion of privatization of state-owned companies, 
cut in costs throughout government, and salary cutbacks. In December of 1993 Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, Minister of the Treasure Department, sent to Congress a group of 
economic, financial, and fiscal measures to prepare the economy for the implementation 
of the Real Plan in the following year.
The Real Plan (July of 1994)
Contrary to the previous economic plans, the Real Plan was not a package of measures to 
shock the economy in a day. The plan was preceded by stages of preparation, which gave the economy 
the possibility to accommodate and the government the chance to balance its accounts. In this sense, 
the Real Plan introduced the following measures:
1. Creation of a Social Fund of Emergency (FSE), which keeps 15% of the revenue from all 
taxes and federal contributions. With this mechanism, the government was able to 
guarantee resources without the need to emit currency;
2. Creation of the Unit of Real Value (URV), a daily index tied to the dollar that began 
measuring the present inflation (and no longer the past inflation). The URV was used to 
correct federal taxes and public fares;
3. Conversion of all wages to URV using an average of the 4 previous months. In addition, 
they could only be readjusted after 12 months.
4. Voluntary conversion of all prices to URV, and;
5. Transformation of URV into national currency, Real (R$), starting July 1st, 1994.
The effects of the Real Plan were immediately felt, as the inflation rate 
plummeted (from 2,406.8% in 1994 to 14.8% in 1995). The commerce attracted buyers
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by accepting pre-dated checks and credit cards. The freeze of public fares (electricity, 
telephone, and mail), fuel, and important food items decreased the cost of living of those 
with lower income. There was an explosion in consumption. The ease of importing 
brought into the country many foreign products such as cars, appliances, food items, and 
some luxuries. The evaluation of the Real Plan after its first year was positive and the 
population supported the plan. This public sentiment was reflected in the Presidential 
elections of 1994, in which Fernando Henrique Cardoso, father of the Real Plan, was 
elected President of Brazil.
Cardoso Administration (1995 to 2002)
The new administration brought in reforms they considered essential to modernize 
the country, stabilize the economy, and resume economic growth. The most important 
changes included the breakdown of monopoly over petroleum and telecommunications, 
and alteration in the definition of national company, in order to welcome foreign capital. 
During this administration Mercosul—a free-trade area between Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay—was implemented. The president also gave continuity to the 
Real Plan by promoting a few adjustments to the economy, such as increasing interest 
rates to cool off internal demand, and the devaluation of the Real to stimulate exports and 
balance the Trade Balance.
With the Real Plan and the control over the currency exchange, the government 
controlled inflation at very low levels (2.62% in 1998). However, there were signs of 
recession (GDP rose by only 0.2% in 1998), such as a decrease in consumption and 
massive layoffs, which resulted in high unemployment (6.32% in 1998) in the industrial
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and agricultural sectors. Also, international dependency helped increase the external
debt.
During the 1998 Asian Crisis, the government tried to save the Real and the 
escape of investments by increasing interest rates and by getting help from the IMF. The 
country contracted a US$ 40 billion loan and was forced to take measures, such as the 
devaluation of the Real, an increase in government revenue, and a decrease in 
government spending, which decreased economic activity. From that point on, the 
administration tried different measures to keep inflation low, but that came with the price 
of low economic growth. By 2002 inflation was once again becoming a problem 
(14.71%), mainly as a result of expectations, as the Presidential elections’ poll pointed to 






Quarterly Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP), 1975 - 2002
Q uarter GDP Q uarter GDP Q uarter GDP
1975.1 0.000000079616 1984.3 0.000036367 1994.1 18881.6267
1975.2 0.000000095948 1984.4 0.000049718 1994.2 66458.8108
1975.3 0.00000010009 1985.1 0.0001 1994.3 128495.3868
1975.4 0.00000010599 1985.2 0.0001 1994.4 135368.8548
1976.1 0.00000011911 1985.3 0.0001 1995.1 143063.7107
1976.2 0.00000014618 1985.4 0.0002 1995.2 155012.9519
1976.3 0.00000015941 1986.1 0.0003 1995.3 166058.5240
1976.4 0.00000016946 1986.2 0.0003 1995.4 182056.3304
1977.1 0.00000018582 1986.3 0.0004 1996.1 170503.8368
1977.2 0.00000023436 1986.4 0.0004 1996.2 189621.0214
1977.3 0.00000023668 1987.1 0.0005 1996.3 203395.5504
1977.4 0.00000024968 1987.2 0.0009 1996.4 215366.3184
1978.1 0.00000026112 1987.3 0.0012 1997.1 192912.3453
1978.2 0.00000032409 1987.4 0.0016 1997.2 212193.9891
1978.3 0.00000035359 1988.1 0.0025 1997.3 222703.6578
1978.4 0.00000037656 1988.2 0.0045 1997.4 242933.0418
1979.1 0.00000040630 1988.3 0.0082 1998.1 210605.7343
1979.2 0.00000050793 1988.4 0.0157 1998.2 233103.8582
1979.3 0.00000057332 1989.1 0.0281 1998.3 233974.0969
1979.4 0.00000068017 1989.2 0.0431 1998.4 236504.1875
1980.1 0.00000084453 1989.3 0.1021 1999.1 221628.8614
1980.2 0.0000010832 1989.4 0.2747 1999.2 247581.6956
1980.3 0.0000013115 1990.1 1.4179 1999.3 241182.2048
1980.4 0.0000015478 1990.2 2.2431 1999.4 263453.2042
1981.1 0.0000017564 1990.3 3.0525 2000.1 250866.3657
1981.2 0.0000022198 1990.4 4.8353 2000.2 271619.4524
1981.3 0.0000024894 1991.1 6.9815 2000.3 284896.3058
1981.4 0.0000027258 1991.2 10.6985 2000.4 293872.9541
1982.1 0.0000033456 1991.3 15.4224 2001.1 280473.8204
1982.2 0.0000044121 1991.4 27.1835 2001.2 295488.4797
1982.3 0.0000051870 1992.1 49.0106 2001.3 303346.5847
1982.4 0.0000056864 1992.2 91.1975 2001.4 320751.4792
1983.1 0.0000060570 1992.3 173.5820 2002.1 295848.2780
1983.2 0.0000085931 1992.4 327.1687 2002.2 324115.7860
1983.3 0.000011704 1993.1 666.9203 2002.3 337220.2600
1983.4 0.000015510 1993.2 1465.1312 2002.4 364306.1730
1984.1 0.000019395 1993.3 3568.5997




RGDP - Quarterly, 1975 - 2002
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Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 1964 -  2002 








1964 28.9 3.4% 1984 98.8 5.4%
1965 29.6 2.4% 1985 106.5 7.8%
1966 31.6 6.7% 1986 114.5 7.5%
1967 32.9 4.2% 1987 118.6 3.5%
1968 36.1 9.8% 1988 118.5 -0.1%
1969 39.6 9.5% 1989 122.2 3.2%
1970 43.7 10.4% 1990 116.8 -4.4%
1971 48.7 11.3% 1991 117.4 1.0%
1972 54.5 11.9% 1992 116.8 0.5%
1973 62.0 14.0% 1993 122.5 4.9%
1974 67.1 8.2% 1994 129.7 5.9%
1975 70.6 5.2% 1995 135.2 4.2%
1976 78.0 10.3% 1996 139.0 2.7%
1977 81.7 4.9% 1997 143.8 3.3%
1978 85.7 5.0% 1998 142.4 0.2%
1979 91.6 6.8% 1999 143.6 0.8%
1980 100.0 9.2% 2000 149.6 4.2%
1981 95.8 -4.3% 2001 160.1 1.5%
1982 96.5 0.8% 2002 178.6 -
1983 93.7 -2.9%
Source: APEC (Promoting Association of Economic Studies), APECAO XLII, [Rio de 
Janeiro, 2003]. (Primary source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
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Quarterly Inflation Rate, 1975 - 2002
Table 4
Q uarter Inflation Q uarter Inflation Q uarter Inflation
1975.1 6.07% 1984.3 31.45% 1994.1 129.43%
1975.2 6.14% 1984.4 32.99% 1994.2 129.99%
1975.3 7.21% 1985.1 35.51% 1994.3 29.60%
1975.4 6.58% 1985.2 22.84% 1994.4 5.59%
1976.1 10.93% 1985.3 32.05% 1995.1 4.32%
1976.2 9.84% 1985.4 37.20% 1995.2 5.32%
1976.3 11.34% 1986.1 38.29% 1995.3 2.45%
1976.4 6.56% 1986.2 0.27% 1995.4 1.83%
1977.1 11.06% 1986.3 3.05% 1996.1 2.77%
1977.2 2.46% 1986.4 11.41% 1996.2 3.60%
1977.3 5.14% 1987.1 41.15% 1996.3 1.22%
1977.4 7.46% 1987.2 73.54% 1996.4 1.38%
1978.1 9.35% 1987.3 21.85% 1997.1 3.16%
1978.2 10.20% 1987.4 41.51% 1997.2 1.59%
1978.3 8.04% 1988.1 54.95% 1997.3 0.64%
1978.4 7.14% 1988.2 60.67% 1997.4 1.86%
1979.1 13.20% 1988.3 70.19% 1998.1 1.13%
1979.2 9.56% 1988.4 84.44% 1998.2 0.38%
1979.3 10.19% 1989.1 52.59% 1998.3 -0.57%
1979.4 18.12% 1989.2 44.69% 1998.4 0.77%
1980.1 17.01% 1989.3 113.28% 1999.1 7.57%
1980.2 17.97% 1989.4 133.36% 1999.2 0.71%
1980.3 20.65% 1990.1 224.90% 1999.3 4.51%
1980.4 21.09% 1990.2 29.43% 1999.4 5.65%
1981.1 22.41% 1990.3 37.62% 2000.1 1.39%
1981.2 16.13% 1990.4 48.07% 2000.2 1.73%
1981.3 16.88% 1991.1 48.29% 2000.3 4.77%
1981.4 13.46% 1991.2 25.13% 2000.4 1.52%
1982.1 20.37% 1991.3 44.51% 2001.1 1.63%
1982.2 19.47% 1991.4 73.75% 2001.2 3.03%
1982.3 15.52% 1992.1 72.33% 2001.3 2.90%
1982.4 15.92% 1992.2 62.41% 2001.4 2.39%
1983.1 25.66% 1992.3 74.60% 2002.1 0.48%
1983.2 28.21% 1992.4 72.86% 2002.2 3.55%
1983.3 36.21% 1993.1 83.05% 2002.3 7.05%
1983.4 29.25% 1993.2 91.20% 2002.4 12.75%
1984.1 32.02% 1993.3 102.48%




Inflation (CPI) - Quarterly, 1975 - 2002
Quarter
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Annual Inflation Rate, 1964 -  2002 
(in percent change in consumer price index)
Table 5
Year Inflation Year Inflation
1964 83.9% 1984 220.6%
1965 37.0% 1985 225.5%
1966 37.6% 1986 142.3%
1967 24.3% 1987 224.8%
1968 23.5% 1988 684.5%
1969 20.0% 1989 1,320.0%
1970 19.0% 1990 2,739.7%
1971 19.2% 1991 414.7%
1972 15.6% 1992 991.4%
1973 15.7% 1993 2,103.7%
1974 33.6% 1994 2,406.8%
1975 29.0% 1995 14.8%
1976 45.0% 1996 9.3%
1977 42.7% 1997 4.02%
1978 38.7% 1998 2.33%
1979 53.9% 1999 7.67%
1980 100.2% 2000 4.87%
1981 109.9% 2001 8.54%
1982 95.4% 2002 13.09%
1983 154.5%
Sources:
Rates between 1964 and 1996 - Library of Congress Country Studies (Primary source: 
Fundacao Getulio Vargas (FGV), Conjuntura Economica [Rio de Janeiro], various 
issues.).
Rates between 1997 and 2002 -  Institute Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE), 




Inflation Rate (CPI) - Annually, 1964-2002
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